and other governmental subdivisions may be granted a similar array of powers. Not only do most corporations have these powers in common with natural persons, but just as natural persons they also operate under the constraint that they may not use them unlawfully. For example, a biological person's "natural" power to enter a contract 1 does not confer the power to enter a contract in restraint of trade that would be prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 A corporation has this power only if it is explicitly granted. But by the same token, one should never infer from the mere fact that a corporation was authorized to enter into contracts that it was authorized to engage in price fixing or anticompetitive boycotts.
At the same time, antitrust law's "state action" doctrine permits the states to regulate and even to "authorize" anticompetitive conduct, provided that they state their intention to do so clearly 3 and that they also actively supervise any private conduct that * Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 1 In fact, federal statutes convey to at least some natural persons the right to make contracts or transact in property. See 42 U.S.C. §1981 ("All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right …to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white persons…."); 42 U.S.C. §1982 (similar: "same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property").
2 15 U.S.C. §1. 3 California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alum., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (the challenged restraint must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy"), interpreting Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) . Cf. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982) (refusing to infer "clear articulation" from a generalized "home rule" provision that gave municipality power to regulate within its boundaries); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62-63 under state law reviewed and approved a merger, then federal courts may be required to stand aside.
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A few courts have carried the idea of "authorization" much further, however, concluding that authorizing a firm to engage in its ordinary corporate activities, such as contracting or acquiring assets, also operates to authorize conduct that would otherwise be unlawful under the antitrust laws. This reasoning is incorrect for a number of reasons. First, the states' own antitrust laws almost invariably make clear that by authorizing firms to "contract" or "acquire," they did not mean to authorize anticompetitive acquisitions.
6 Second, inferring a state action immunity from ordinary corporate powers creates a virtual blanket antitrust exemption for most of the activities engaged in by most American business corporations. For example, virtually all business corporations are "authorized" by corporate law to make contracts, to own property, or to acquire assets, including the assets or equity of other corporations.
Collectively this group of powers runs across the full range of potential antitrust violations, from price-fixing agreements to tying and exclusive dealing, boycott agreements, mergers, and most instances of anticompetitive exclusion. Indeed, it (1985) (authorization for agencies to engage in rate making did not of itself authorize collective rate making). S. 964 (1999) . Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that the antitrust laws had not been violated. See 309 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2002) . See also Shames v. California Travel and Tourism Com'n, 626 F.3d 1079 (9 th Cir. 2010) (authorization to rental car companies to "pass on" certain fees to customers did not imply authorization for their collusive agreement about how much was to be passed on); First Am. Title Co. v. DeVaugh, 480 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2007) (state action immunity did not shield county registries of deeds from claim that they monopolized the market for land title documents by conditioning copying on purchaser's promise not to sell certified copies to third parties, which made it hard for third-party title plants to maintain duplicate land records; state statutes in question gave the registries the power to make contracts, and a limited monopoly to the extent that they received transaction information from the original parties to a land transaction, recorded it, and retained possession of official title documents; but there was no authorization for a restraint on resale of copies of such documents); Capital City Cab Service, Inc. v. Susquehanna Area Reg. Airport Authority, 470 F. Supp. 2d 462 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (mere power to contract not sufficient authorization for allegedly anticompetitive exclusive contract).
This conclusion was not undermined by the fact that the state statutes authorized "any person, corporation, partnership, or group of persons," to "sell any hospital health service" and that this power was granted "notwithstanding any other law to the contrary."
10 The court refused to conclude from this last statement that "any other law"
included the Sherman Act-that is, that the legislature by this ambiguous provision had "clearly articulated" a policy of permitting non-sovereign actors to engage in anticompetitive conduct. 11 The court then concluded that it would not infer: a policy to displace competition from naked grants of authority. These are the enabling statutes by which myriad instruments of local government across the country gain basic corporate powers. To infer a policy to displace competition from, for example, authority to enter into joint ventures or other business forms would stand federalism on its head. A state would henceforth be required to disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the peril of creating an instrument of local government with power the state did not intend to grant. The immediate practical effect would be the extension of the Parker principle downward, contrary to the teaching that local instruments of government are subject to the Sherman Act. Also incorrect are cases concluding that the power to acquire intellectual property rights implies the power to commit patent misuse or antitrust violations based on abuse of intellectual property rights. For example, one decision held that a statute authorizing a university to acquire and manage assets, including intellectual property, implicitly authorized the university to acquire an exclusive patent license by fraud. 16 Once again, there may have been no antitrust violation, but lack of violation does not yield state action immunity. Others have inferred an antitrust immunity for anticompetitive exclusive contracts from a broad grant of the power to contract. 17 On situations in the last class, the power to contract certainly implies the power to enter into at least some exclusive provider agreements, for the great majority of such agreements are lawful. But one would not assume without additional clarification that such authority included the power to enter into the occasionally unlawful, anticompetitive agreement. In sum, the corporation relying on the ordinary corporate grant of the power to contract faces the same set of antitrust risks as any contractor -namely, a duty to avoid the occasional anticompetitive contract.
Equally problematic are decisions holding or suggesting that the power to buy and sell property implies the power to enter into otherwise unlawful mergers. 18 Nearly all state chartered business corporations have the power to buy and sell property, including corporate equities or assets. Nevertheless, the Clayton Act expressly forbids any "person" from merging unlawfully, and makes clear that "person" includes In Phoebe Putney the Eleventh Circuit held that the state action doctrine foreclosed an FTC challenge to a hospital merger that was alleged to be anticompetitive. 21 The Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision.
The authorizing provision that the court found decisive in Phoebe Putney provided that:
Every hospital authority shall be deemed to exercise public and essential governmental functions and shall have all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of this article, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powers:
(1) To sue and be sued; (4) To acquire by purchase, lease, or otherwise and to operate projects;….
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The provision said nothing about anticompetitive mergers that might violate federal antitrust laws. Further, the powers that the statute authorized were powers typically held by any business corporation and many governmental subdivisions. While the hospital authority was for at least some purposes treated as a government subdivision, the Supreme Court has made clear that only the federal government and the "state itself" have sovereignty; as a result, subdivisions must be authorized. 23 Other subdivisions, including municipalities, have only those powers that the state authorizes for them.
In finding immunity the court reasoned:
…the Georgia legislature must have anticipated anticompetitive harm when it authorized hospital acquisitions by the authorities. It defies imagination to suppose the legislature could have believed that every geographic market in Georgia was so replete with hospitals that authorizing acquisitions by the authorities could have no serious anticompetitive consequences. The legislature could hardly have thought that Georgia's more rural markets could support so many hospitals that acquisitions by an authority would not harm competition. We therefore conclude that, through the Hospital Authorities Law, the Georgia legislature clearly articulated a policy authorizing the displacement of competition.
24
The court appeared to assume that by stating no exceptions the statute meant to authorize all mergers without regard for federal antitrust law. A more logical reading is that the statute gave the hospital districts the power to make acquisitions, provided that these acquisitions were not unlawful on other grounds. For example, the Georgia What the court failed to see, however, was that the initial acquisition in the Lee County case was not a merger to monopoly at all. The hospital in that case had a 100%
share to begin with, and the statute did no more than facilitate the transfer of this hospital from its previous owners to the new hospital authority. 31 Transferring a 25 O.C.G.A., Tit. 14, §14-2-1102; see also id. at §14-2-1105 (governing plans of merger or share exchange).
26 Id., §14-5-7. 27 Id., §14-3-845. 28 The Georgia Code also provides that "The immunity from antitrust liability afforded to local governments by the provisions of Code Sections 36-65-1 and 36-65-2 shall not apply to public providers in the offering and providing of services as defined in this chapter; and public providers shall be subject to applicable antitrust liabilities…. In 1963, when the Board was originally created, there was only one hospital in existence in Lee County. Pursuant to the powers given it, the Board acquired the hospital, creating a monopoly. In 1987, the legislature, with the knowledge that it had given the Board the power to create a monopoly July, 2012, Page 10 hospital with a 100% market share from one owner to another does not "create" a monopoly but merely reassigns its ownership. By contrast, subsequent acquisitions after multiple hospitals existed in the area would lessen competition. That is,.a merger to monopoly requires the union of two (or more) independent units into one. Thus by approving it the state legislature expressed no opinion whatsoever on the creation of monopoly by merger, or for that matter any other merger that threatened to lessen competition.
Conclusion
Federal antitrust policy's commitment to federalism is strong -so strong, in fact, that it permits states to immunize almost any kind of intrastate conduct, provided that they state their wishes clearly and do not permit private actors to hijack the process. At the same time, however, the inference is strong that the states have a commitment to the maintenance of competition -attested by the fact that nearly every state has an antitrust law of its own, most of them modeled on the Sherman Act. For that reason the presumption must be strong that before state action immunity will be granted the state must assert with clarity that this was the policy it intended.
in 1963, further expanded the implicit power of the Board to acquire other hospitals. Thus, if the legislature knew at the time it expanded the Board's acquisition powers in 1987 that a monopoly had resulted from the 1963 legislation, the legislature must have reasonably anticipated that further acquisitions, resulting from the 1987 legislation, would increase the Board's market share in an anticompetitive manner.
